Miasanrot
·13 de enero de 2025
Miasanrot
·13 de enero de 2025
Kompany is doing an objectively good job at Bayern. His philosophy is consistent, the principles of possession-based positional play, a high backline and pressing are present in nearly every match this season. These principles won’t change much –to be expected from a long-term system– but the tactics around them have changed subtly, especially after the defeat vs. Barcelona.
This article written by Pepe Salazar
Besides that, the change is an intelligent reaction and an urgent adaptation to the constant injuries in certain positions, right back (RB) and central defensive midfielder (CDM) being the two most affected. This is a general overview of Kompanyball; then and now.
Kompany started the season full throttle. This was evident in the way Bayern pressed and played an insanely high backline. It was a bit like Guardiola, Bielsa and RB football principles applied during different game phases. The rewards were impressive, with massive numbers in goals scored, but there are no tactical approaches that have no trade-offs.
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The nominal formation used is still a 4-2-3-1, but throughout different phases the structure changes, and players constantly switch positions all over the pitch.
Chaos! Against Wolfsburg, Kompany tried building up with the goal keeper (GK) as another center back (CB) (like Guardiola did at times with City), positioning the CB’s as wide as fullbacks. The idea here, was to create a numerical overload from the build-up, creating a 3-2 structure, while also allowing the fullbacks to position themselves as wingers, and the wingers to move as inside forwards. Kimmich and Pavlovic were mostly in charge of this phase.
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A makeshift 3-2-4-2 (3-2-6) can be created if the GK is positioned as an extra CB. Besides this, the constant movement from other players in the build up created a lot of instability in opponent defenses but was extremely dangerous (for Bayern) whenever the ball was lost in this phase, as seen during one of the goals conceded against Wolfsburg.
Upa and Kim’s positioning being so far and wide was very dangerous if the ball was lost in the build up. Kompany dropped Kimmich to the backline in this phase. He could either play as a CB or RCB, switching with Upamecano, and this subtle change contributed to the team being more solid going forward, as an efficient build up phase is key for any possession oriented team. Kane and Musiala also switched positions often, with one or both dropping back when necessary. While Laimer stayed mostly wide, Davies was a bit closer to the back line and DM’s, with Kompany using him more frequently as an inverted left back (LB) paired with an overlapping left wing (LW).
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A more conservative 3-4-3 with Kimmich dropping to the backline, Davies inverting, Moose and/or Kane dropping deep, Gnabry and Laimer overlap, and Olise moves to an inside forward position.
At the beginning of the season Bayern was playing with lopsided pairs of an overlapping fullback and an inside forward, with 2 CBs covering half the pitch, a single DM, mostly Pavlovic, staying deeper to allow Kimmich to take more of an inverted fullback role similar to Trent Alexander Arnold. Bayern was overloading the box with swarms of players, which created an obscene amount of goals but also put the CBs and GK in very risky positions during transitions.
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By attacking in a somewhat lopsided 3-1-6 structure (similar to Nagelsmann) Bayer was able to overload the half-spaces, making it difficult even for back five lines to mark individual players. The constant switching between Olise and Laimer, the threat by Kimmich’s deep passes from the right halfspace, and the movement between Musiala and Kane, created tons of goals in the first few games. Due to the fullbacks being positioned so far up the pitch, the two CBs were still isolated in counter-attacking situations. After Barcelona scored four goals from that circumstance, Kompany took a safer (yet, also attacking) approach.
To reinforce his defense, Kompany made his attack smarter and more efficient. Instead of the obvious extra defensive midfielder or playing a nominal back three like other managers would, he opted to defend through possession, like a true Guardiola student. In this new approach, the RB has the most demanding job, overlapping in the attacking phase, occasionally inverting and making runs into the right halfspace by switching positions with the RW, and then having to track back to the RB role so Kimmich can return to his RCDM position in the defensive phase. The insane physical demands required from the RB in this approach meant Laimer would be the main RB instead of Kimmich. So far it’s worked very well, but shouldn’t Boey and Stanisic be able to stay fit, yet again, Bayern will soon be in need of a RB.
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Bayern’s attacking 3-3-4, which becomes a 3-4-3 diamond if Musiala stays behind Kane or a 3-2-5 if Olise or Davies move into the right halfspace, is balanced and risk averse. Davies stays in a more inverted role, closer to the DMs and CBs. The trade-off of this approach is that Laimer has to overlap, switch with Olise, press, and track back. Bayern has kept more clean sheets, but opponents still target the right flank as they know it’s the most fragile spot in the Bayern structure.
At the beginning of the season, Bayern pressed in an almost Bielsa-type man to man marking, with overloads on the ball side. This was extremely efficient as seen in the 9-2 pummeling against Zagreb. The obvious trade-off of this style was that teams that were able to beat the press or play a killer long ball were able to create problems for Bayern rather easily, with the CBs left isolated in 1v1 situations. This Bielsa-type pressing can be demanding and cause injuries or burnout sooner than later, and it wouldn’t be sustainable for Bayern to play that way, every game, for 90 minutes.
If the pressing failed, Bayern had to drop back mostly to 4-4-2 or 4-2-3-1 structures.
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Bayern pressed in a man-to-man system, creating overloads near the ball, leading the Bundesliga in average recovery time. At the beginning of the season this was extremely effective but eventually the risks and compromises of this approach were too much, especially with injuries in the RB and CDM positions, so Kompany once again, adapted.
Bayern is still pressing, but in a more intelligent way, either through pressing traps or trying to intercept heavy passes in the opponents’ build up. Occasional man-to-man situations arise, but the pressing is now mostly zonal or at least mixed, so the forwards can preserve more energy throughout the match, and the defensive line gets more assistance from the midfield.
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Olise and Gnabry are much more committed to helping Davies and Laimer. Musiala and Kane are not pressing like crazy but rather covering passing lanes, while Kimmich, if unable to press, will drop deeper. Bayern rarely plays a low block, so even when the team “drops back”, it is still quite high up the pitch, albeit in a more compact defensive shape. In this way, Bayern can defend high up the pitch without depending so much upon constant pressing.
Bayern is getting smarter. Also, with Palhinha, Ito, Boey, and Stanisic coming back from injuries, the midfield and backline should get more support. Kompany will be able to rotate the squad, the RB will not be forced to cover so much ground as roles may become a bit more balanced.
It’s hard to see Kompany’s tactics “fail”; by now his principles and style are settled into the squad’s identity, roles and positions, are well established, and reinforcements (or rather, soon-to-be-fit players) are coming.
As the season progresses, since Kompanyball can be physically demanding, rotations will be very important to keep squad depth and also have back-up players that are in sync with the main squad. The cherry on top for the next half of the season could be an understated signing of a hard-working player that can bring more depth to the squad.
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